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Abstract. Despite their accuracy, neural network-based classifiers are still 
prone to manipulation through adversarial perturbations. Those perturbations 
are designed to be misclassified by the neural network, while being 
perceptually identical to some valid input. The vast majority of attack 
methods rely on white-box conditions, where the attacker has full knowledge 
of the attacked network’s parameters. This allows the attacker to calculate 
the network’s loss gradient with respect to some valid input and use this 
gradient in order to create an adversarial example. The task of blocking 
white-box attacks has proven difficult to solve. While a large number of 
defense methods have been suggested, they have had limited success. In this 
work we examine this difficulty and try to understand it. We systematically 
explore the abilities and limitations of defensive distillation, one of the most 
promising defense mechanisms against adversarial perturbations suggested 
so far in order to understand the defense challenge. We show that contrary to 
commonly held belief, the ability to bypass defensive distillation is not 
dependent on an attack’s level of sophistication. In fact, simple approaches, 
such as the Targeted Gradient Sign Method, are capable of effectively 
bypassing defensive distillation. We prove that defensive distillation is highly 
effective against non-targeted attacks but is unsuitable for targeted attacks. 
This discovery leads us to realize that targeted attacks leverage the same input 
gradient that allows a network to be trained. This implies that blocking them 
will require losing the network’s ability to learn, presenting an impossible 
tradeoff to the research community. 
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1. Introduction  
The discovery of adversarial perturbations against neural networks [1] unleashed an 
arms race between attack and defense methods in recent years. In this race, ever 
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more powerful attack methods were discovered, creating adversarial examples that 
are perceptually indistinguishable from valid input, yet are incorrectly classified by 
the neural network. Most of the attack methods suggested so far operate in white-
box conditions and assume that the adversary has full knowledge of the attacked 
network’s parameters. This knowledge allows the attacker to calculate the 
network’s loss gradient with respect to some valid input point and use this gradient 
in order to perturb the input until it is able to mislead the classifier. This process is 
quite similar to the “standard” gradient back-propagation performed during network 
training. However, in this case the network’s weights are kept constant, and the 
input itself is being updated. The result is an adversarial example that is 
misclassified by the neural network.  
Throughout most of this arms race attackers have had the upper hand. The task of 
blocking adversarial perturbations, or even distinguishing them from valid input, 
has proven difficult. A large number of defense methods have been suggested, but 
they have had very limited success [16][17]. The sheer number of failed attempts 
suggests that there is some fundamental reason that makes adversarial perturbations 
so difficult to defend against. In spite of this situation, only a limited amount of 
research has been performed in an attempt to understand the root cause of this 
difficulty. In this work we aim to shed light on the fundamental principles that make 
defense mechanisms against adversarial perturbations fail time after time. We focus 
our work on white-box attack methods, attempting to understand the nature of the 
loss gradients that lead to their creation.  
We start our analysis by examining defensive distillation [6], one of the more 
promising defense methods suggested so far. Defensive distillation is particularly 
interesting in our case as it attempts to nullify the loss gradient resulting from the 
last softmax layer and thus prevents the creation of adversarial examples. In order 
to do so, defensive distillation increases the probability estimate associated with the 
most probable class and decreases the probabilities of all other classes. This leads 
to a reduction of several orders of magnitude in the loss gradient associated with the 
most probable class, until, in many cases, it becomes too small to be represented by 
a standard 32-bit floating point variable. In doing so, defensive distillation leverages 
the floating point accuracy limitation in order to block white-box attack methods. 
The concept of gradient masking [19], as implemented by defensive distillation, 
appeared to be highly promising. However, not long after defensive distillation was 
published, Carlini and Wagner (C&W) [5] designed a highly sophisticated attack 
method in order to overcome it. The C&W attack ignores the classifier’s softmax 
layer, and introduces a dedicated set of a loss function and an optimization scheme. 
Together, those elements are able to “restore” the lost gradient signal and use it for 
creating adversarial examples.  
The C&W attack is commonly credited with being the first to bypass defensive 
distillation, and its success is attributed to its high level of sophistication. However, 
our work indicates that this perception is in fact inaccurate. We follow the footsteps 
of [8] and show that defensive distillation can be bypassed using simple attack 
methods, such as the Targeted Gradient Sign Method (TGSM) [7]. In order to 
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explain this observation, we present a simple framework for visualizing the outputs 
of the last two layers of the classifier network. We do that by reducing a multi-class 
classification task into a binary problem, arbitrarily choosing two of the original 
classes. The reduced problem domain allows us to visualize the output of the last 
two layers of the classifier network using a two dimensional chart. Based on our 
visualization framework, we can explore the influence of defensive distillation over 
the neural network’s gradients when faced with different types of adversarial 
attacks. This exploration led us to hypothesize and eventually prove that defensive 
distillation is highly effective against non-targeted attacks but is unsuitable for 
handling targeted attacks. This alone is a valuable insight, however it leads us to a 
considerably more important understanding, which is the main contribution of this 
work: White-box targeted adversarial attacks leverage the same input gradients that 
are used for training a classifier network. Therefore, the ability to block them relies 
on making the classifier “untrainable”, presenting an impossible tradeoff to the 
research community. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background 
about adversarial manipulations and defense mechanisms. Section 3 contains a 
description of our gradient analysis framework and the use of this framework to 
analyze the function of defensive distillation in the context of various attack 
methods. Section 4 provides a formal proof that defensive distillation is effective 
against non-targeted attack methods but unsuitable for handling targeted ones. 
Section 5 provides the main contribution of this work. It explains why blocking 
targeted adversarial perturbations requires eliminating the network’s ability to learn. 
Finally, Section 6 provides our final conclusions and future research avenues.  
2. Background 
In this section, we provide the needed background about adversarial manipulations 
and survey key attack and defense methods. 
2.1. Crafting Adversarial Examples  
Crafting adversarial examples in white-box conditions generally implies solving a 
set of two constraints. The attacker aims to identify some small perturbation 𝛿, that 
when added to a valid input vector 𝑥, will cause the classifier 𝑓(∙) to misclassify the 
perturbed input. This perturbation must also be small enough to ensure it is 
undetectable by humans. Using 𝑥′ to denote the resulting adversarial example 𝑥′ =
(𝑥 +  𝛿), and 𝑌 to denote the true class label, we can formally define the adversary’s 
goal as follows:  
 
𝑓(𝑥′) ≠ 𝑌 (1) 
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𝑠. 𝑡. ‖𝛿‖𝑝 < 𝜀 
The first constraint in equation (1) ensures incorrect classification, while the 
second controls the perturbation magnitude. Here 𝜀 stands for the perturbation 
radius given some context specific distance metric ‖∙‖𝑝. Limiting the value 𝜀 aims 
to prevent the perturbation from being detected.  
Various optimization methods for solving the constraints in (1) have been suggested 
in recent years. Typically, the methods include computation of 𝑓(𝑥), calculation of 
the loss gradient with respect to the input, and one or more steps in which the input 
is perturbed based on the gradient, in order to cause it to be misclassified by the 
network. 
Attack methods are often divided into two classes: targeted and non-targeted 
attacks. In the case of non-targeted attacks, the attacker wishes to deviate from the 
true class label but does not care which other class is chosen. This goal is typically 
achieved by maximizing the network’s loss with respect to the true class. 
Targeted attacks, on the other hand, aim to manipulate the network to predict some 
specific class label given the input. Like non-targeted attacks, those methods use 
the loss gradient in order to perturb the input. However, instead of maximizing the 
loss with respect to the true class, targeted attack methods aim to minimize the loss 
associated with the selected target class. By doing so, targeted attack methods allow 
the attacker full control of the classification result.  
Much of the prior research of adversarial examples deals with image classification 
tasks. In this context, three distance metrics are commonly used as a proxy for 
human perception: 1) 𝐿0 measures the number of perturbed features (i.e., image 
pixels), 2) 𝐿2 measures the perturbation’s Euclidian norm, and 3) 𝐿∞ measures the 
maximal change to any of the input features. Applying adversarial manipulations 
to additional content domains similarly requires the identification of a suitable 
distance metric.  
 
The following sub-sections provide details about several notable attack methods and 
describe the effect of adversarial perturbations on the classifier network. 
2.1.1. Fast Gradient Sign Method and Basic Iterative Method 
The Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [3] was the first identified method to allow 
computationally efficient crafting of non-targeted adversarial examples. Using a 
single gradient calculation, the algorithm perturbs each of the input features by a 
magnitude of 𝜀 in the direction of the loss gradient. Formally this is expressed as:  
𝑥′ =  𝑥 + 𝜀 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(∇𝑥 𝐽(𝑥, 𝑌)) (2) 
where 𝐽(𝑥, 𝑌) represents the classifier’s loss given an input vector 𝑥 and true class 
label 𝑌.  
The Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [4] is an extension of FGSM. Instead of 
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performing a single step in the direction of the gradient, BIM performs up to ℎ 
iterations of equation (2). Each iteration is using a smaller perturbation step 𝛾, such 
that 𝜀 =  ℎ ∗ 𝛾. The gradient is recalculated in each step, and the algorithm stops as 
soon as the perturbation is able to mislead the classifier. The result, in most cases, 
is a considerably refined perturbation pattern compared to FGSM. 
2.1.2. Targeted Gradient Sign Method 
FGSM was originally designed as a non-targeted attack method. It causes input to 
be misclassified by the classifier network but does not allow the attacker control of 
the classification output. In [7], the authors presented a targeted variant of FGSM 
referred to as the Targeted Gradient Sign Method (TGSM), as well as a targeted 
variant of BIM. Instead of maximizing the loss with respect to the true class label, 
TGSM attempts to minimize the loss with respect to the target class 𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (note 
how the perturbation is subtracted from the valid input) : 
𝑥′ =  𝑥 − 𝜀 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (∇𝑥 𝐽(𝑥, 𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡)) (3) 
2.1.3. Jacobian Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) 
In [2], the authors suggested a greedy iterative algorithm for crafting targeted 
adversarial examples. In each iteration, the algorithm computes a saliency map 
based on the network’s Jacobian and perturbs the two most salient input features. 
One of the features is used for decreasing the probability estimate of the correct 
class, while the other is used for increasing the probability estimate of the target 
class. This procedure minimizes the number of perturbed features. 
Indeed, the iterative nature of the JSMA algorithm minimizes the number of 
perturbed features, however computing the full Jacobian is highly demanding in 
terms of computation resources. These high computation demands make JSMA 
impractical for networks with a high input dimensionality, such as ImageNet. 
2.1.4. Carlini & Wagner (C&W) Attack 
In [5], the authors presented an attack method that can to this day defeat most, if not 
all, known defense mechanisms. The C&W attack was specifically designed to 
bypass defensive distillation [6], which was considered an unbeatable defense 
mechanism at the time.  
Defensive distillation aims to prevent the adversary from using the network’s loss 
gradient for creating adversarial examples. It does so by eliminating the loss 
gradient resulting from the network’s softmax layer. In order to overcome the 
distillation effect, the C&W attack introduces two main concepts: First, it ignores 
the softmax output and instead uses the output of the linear layer that immediately 
precedes it, known as the logits layer; then, it replaces the network’s original loss 
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function with an attack oriented one and introduces a dedicated optimization 
process. This process allows a tradeoff between attack success and the size of the 
resulting perturbation.  
The same two principles are applied with minor modification to form a set of three 
attack methods (one for each commonly used distance metric), all sharing the same 
iterative optimization scheme.  
The authors started by rephrasing the objective (loss) function used for crafting a 
targeted attack. Instead of requiring that  
𝑓(𝑥 +  𝛿) = 𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡  (4) 
where 𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 is the label of a destination target class, they introduced a new 
objective function 𝑞(𝑥 +  𝛿) so that  
𝑓(𝑥 +  𝛿) = 𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡  ↔ 𝑞(𝑥 +  𝛿) ≤ 0 (5) 
The original objective function presented in equation (4) is highly nonlinear, 
making it difficult to solve. However, using a monotonically increasing function for 
𝑞, the authors were able to construct an equivalent optimization problem that is both 
easier to solve and controls the tradeoff between perturbation size and the need to 
mislead the classifier: 
min (‖𝛿‖𝑝 + 𝑐 ∙ 𝑞(𝑥 +  𝛿)) 
𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑥 +  𝛿 ∈ [0,1]𝑛 
(6) 
The authors used a standard gradient descend optimizer in order to solve the 
minimization problem presented in equation (6). The constant 𝑐 is used for 
balancing the effect of the perturbation norm against the value of the function 𝑞. Its 
goal is to ensure that both terms influence the optimization process equally. The 
result is a powerful set of attacks for which there are no known defense or detection 
mechanisms. 
The C&W attack is commonly credited for being the first attack method to 
overcome defensive distillation. In this work, we show that much simpler attack 
methods, such as TGSM, are in fact capable of bypassing defensive distillation as 
well. Moreover, we prove that this ability is not related to the level of attack 
sophistication, but rather to the targeted nature of those attacks. 
2.2. Defense Mechanisms 
2.2.1. Adversarial Training 
Adversarial training [1][3] is perhaps the most immediate line of defense against 
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adversarial manipulations. It is based on the intuition that adversarial examples 
occur in sections of the input space that are underrepresented in the training data. 
Adversarial training therefore wishes to augment and enrich the training set. It is 
based on iteratively training the classifier network using adversarial examples by 1) 
training a network to be sufficiently accurate with normal input, 2) generating 
adversarial examples, 3) augmenting the training input, and 4) fine-tuning the 
classifier. 
This simple approach has demonstrated greater model resilience than undefended 
classifiers, however it has a few shortcomings: 1) it is difficult to scale to classifiers 
that process high resolution input [4] like the ImageNet dataset, 2) adversarial 
training based on weak attacks does not provide an adequate defense against 
stronger attacks [11], and 3) it is fairly easy to construct adversarial examples 
against a network that has already been trained to cope with some adversarial 
examples [12]. 
2.2.2. Defensive Distillation 
The term distillation [18] refers to the process of training one network using the 
softmax outputs of another network. Originally, this process was aimed at reducing 
the computational resources required for using a neural network. Hence, the distilled 
network included considerably fewer neurons. Distillation works by first training a 
“teacher” model using the ground truth labels; then using the trained teacher model 
to predict the probability of each training example to belong to each of the potential 
class labels; and finally, using this set of probability estimates to train a “student” 
model. The main goal of this process is to provide the student model with 
knowledge about the interaction between different class labels, which is much richer 
information than a simple indication of the correct class. 
Defensive distillation [6] adapts the basic distillation process described above in 
order to increase the resilience of the distilled network against adversarial examples. 
Defensive distillation does not attempt to reduce the computational load of using a 
neural network, hence the teacher and student network models share a common 
architecture. Instead, it attempts to eliminate the loss gradient propagated from the 
student network’s softmax layer. In order to do so, defensive distillation increases 
the size of the logit component associated with the most probable class compared 
to the components associated with all other classes. This in turn decreases the size 
of the loss gradient of the true class by several orders of magnitude until in many 
cases it can no longer be represented by a standard 32-bit floating point variable. 
This phenomenon, which is referred to as gradient masking [19], prevents the 
adversary from using the loss gradient to create adversarial examples. 
In order to create the gradient masking effect, defensive distillation applies a minor 
modification to the softmax calculation of both teacher and student networks. The 
standard softmax equation is modified to account for the distillation temperature T 
as follows: 
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 𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑧(𝑥) , 𝑇)𝑖 =  
𝑒𝑧𝑖/𝑇
∑ 𝑒𝑧𝑗/𝑇𝑁−1𝑗=0
 
(7) 
Here, 𝑁 denotes the number of potential classes identified by the network, 𝑖 ∈
[0, 𝑁 − 1] is a specific class label index, and z(𝑥) = (𝑧0, 𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑁−1) represents the 
output of the network’s last linear layer known as the logits layer.  
As the distillation temperature increases, the value of 𝑇 becomes larger than 𝑧𝑖, 
causing each of the softmax outputs approach 1/𝑁. In such a case the softmax 
assigns equal probability to all potential classes and is therefore unable to predict 
the true class label. In order to allow correct classification, the training process of 
the distilled network is therefore required to compensate for the training temperature 
by increasing the magnitude of the logits layer’s output. Training a network with a 
high distillation temperature therefore, causes an increase in the magnitude of the 
logits that is proportional to the distillation temperature.  
In the case of defensive distillation both the teacher and student networks are trained 
using a high distillation temperature (e.g., 30). However, when the student model is 
used for inference, the temperature is set to one. The logit signal is still increased 
proportionally to the distillation temperature used during training, however setting 
the temperature to one reverts equation (7) back to a standard softmax. Therefore, 
the softmax calculation resembles a hard max. Informally, we say that the classifier 
becomes more certain about its classification output, making it more resilient to 
adversarial perturbations. 
At the time of its discovery, defensive distillation was able to defeat all known 
adversarial attack methods. The C&W attack [5] was designed to bypass defensive 
distillation, and it was considered the first successful attempt to do so. However, as 
we show in this work, simpler and earlier attack methods are also able to bypass 
defensive distillation. In fact, defensive distillation is inherently incapable of 
defending against targeted attack methods, including (but not limited to) the C&W 
attack. 
3. Exploring Classifier Network Input Gradients 
In [8], the authors show that TGSM can bypass defensive distillation. Through a 
series of experiments, they provide empirical evidence that defensively distilled 
networks eliminate the input gradients associated with FGSM perturbations, but are 
unable of doing the same in the case of TGSM. Despite observing this difference, 
the authors were unable to explain it. 
We follow up on this work, providing a formal analysis of the classifier’s input 
gradients and ultimately proving that defensive distillation is highly effective in 
defending against non-targeted attacks, but is unsuitable for handling targeted 
attacks. 
We start by reducing the MNIST digit classification task [9] into a binary 
classification problem, and training a suitable classifier network. First, two out of 
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the ten available classes are chosen at random. Then the original dataset is filtered 
to include only relevant samples for both training and testing data. Finally a simple 
convolutional neural network is trained, based on the network architecture listed in 
[15]. Following common practices in neural network based classification, the 
network uses the ReLU activation function, a final softmax output and the cross-
entropy loss metric. 
Reducing the number of classes into two allows us to visually explore different 
aspects of the classifier network’s operation using two-dimensional charts. As a first 
experiment, we leverage this ability for studying the logit values produced by the 
network for both normal and adversarial input. Starting with non-targeted FGSM 
and plotting normal logit values side by side to the adversarial ones, the effect of 
adversarial examples over the classifier network is highly evident.   
Figure 1 illustrates the result of this experiment, comparing the logit values for 
normal and FGSM perturbed inputs. The two logits components are indicated by 
the two axes of the plot. The horizontal axis represents the logit component 
associated with class 0, while the vertical axis represents the logit component of 
class 1. Each plotted point represents the logit values of a single input image from 
the test set, all originally belonging to class 1. Given that softmax preserves does 
not change the size order of its outputs compared to its inputs, we get that in order 
to be correctly classified, the vertical component of a given data point should be 
larger than its horizontal component. This is indeed the case for most unperturbed 
inputs, indicating that our two-class problem is rather straightforward. 
The effect of FGSM perturbation is also clearly evident in Figure 1. For the vast 
majority of the perturbed inputs the horizontal component becomes larger than the 
vertical one causing the data point to be incorrectly classified. Not surprisingly, a 
similar looking chart is produced when using other attacks such as JSMA, BIM, 
TGSM, targeted BIM, and C&W. 
Fig. 1. The effect of FGSM on the logit layer outputs. The horizontal and vertical axes 
stand for logit components 0 and 1 respectively. (a) Logit values given normal 
input, (b) logit values for FGSM perturbed input, (c) perturbation shift, 
comparing the original and perturbed input. 
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We continued, performing a second experiment by applying FGSM perturbations 
to a defensively distilled version of the classifier network. Figure 2 presents the 
results of this experiment using a distillation temperature of 𝑇 = 30. The following 
key observations can be made by analyzing Figure 2: 
 Defensive distillation is highly effective against FGSM. This is evident by 
comparing Figure 2 (a), and (b). For most of the plotted data points the 
logit component associated with class 1 remains bigger than that of class 
0, indicating they are correctly classified despite the attack. 
 The absolute values of the logit components for the defensively distilled 
network are roughly 15 times larger than the non-distilled network. This is 
a by-product of training a neural network with defensive distillation. The 
network is “forced” to compensate for the distillation temperature by 
strengthening the logit signal.  
 Non perturbed data points for the defensively distilled network align 
closely to the 𝑋 =  −𝑌 line. Moreover, data points are generally pushed 
farther away from the origin in the defensively distilled network compared 
to the non-distilled network. This is an illustration of the fact that distilled 
networks are “more certain” about their classification outputs.  
By applying the JSMA and BIM attack methods to the distilled network we have 
observed similar outcomes. This indicates the effectiveness of defensive distillation 
against those attack methods, and confirms previously reported results. 
 
Fig. 2.  The effect of FGSM on a defensively distilled classifier network. (a) Logit 
values given normal input, (b) logit values for FGSM perturbed input, (c) 
perturbation shift, comparing the original and perturbed input. 
 
We continued to explore the defensively distilled classifier network using TGSM, 
targeted BIM, and the C&W attacks. In all three cases defensive distillation was 
unable to block the perturbation. Logit values were manipulated and an incorrect 
classification result was chosen. Figure 3 presents the results of this experiment 
using the TGSM attack. While this outcome was expected in the case of the C&W 
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attack, it was unexpected in the case of TGSM and targeted BIM attacks. Recall that 
the C&W attack is considered the first method to successfully bypass defensive 
distillation, and that its success is attributed to its sophistication. Both TGSM and 
targeted BIM were published prior to the C&W attack and are far simpler to 
implement. In addition, we did not expect to see a difference between the targeted 
and non-targeted attack variants in our case. In the context of our binary 
classification problem, we assumed that targeted and non-targeted attacks are 
practically equivalent. Preventing correct classification for one class should 
implicitly mean that the input is classified to the other class. Therefore, the different 
behavior observed for targeted and non-targeted attacks requires further 
investigation.  
After observing that simple, targeted attack methods (e.g., TGSM and targeted 
BIM) are able to bypass defensive distillation, we recalled that the C&W attack is 
targeted by nature. In fact, this attack method does not have a non-targeted variant. 
This understanding led us to rethink the fundamental reasons that allow C&W to 
bypass defensive distillation in the first place. We hypothesized that defensive 
distillation is simply unsuitable for handling targeted attacks, while noting that 
JSMA, which is a targeted attack, is an exception that will require further 
investigation. We have further hypothesized that it is the targeted nature of those 
attacks and not their level of sophistication that allows them to bypass defensive 
distillation.   
 
Fig. 3.  The effect of TGSM on a defensively distilled classifier network. (a) Logit 
values given normal input, (b) logit values for TGSM perturbed input, (c) 
perturbation shift, comparing the original and perturbed input. 
4. Formal Analysis of Input Loss Gradients 
As indicated in Section 3, empirical exploration of the logit values of the 
defensively distilled two-class classifier led us to believe that defensive distillation 
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is inherently unsuitable for dealing with targeted attacks. In this section, we provide 
a formal proof to support this hypothesis. 
 
4.1. Non-Targeted Input Loss Gradients 
Following our previously defined notation, we use 𝑁 as the number of different 
classes that can be assigned by our classifier network. We further use 𝑃𝑖  to denote 
the probability estimate assigned by the network to some class index 𝑖 ∈ {0. . 𝑁 − 1} 
given an input sample 𝑥. Finally, we use 𝑌 =  (𝑦0, 𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑁−1) to represent the one-
hot encoded ground truth classification of the input. 
Under those notations, the network’s cross-entropy loss for the input sample is 
expressed as: 
𝐿 = − ∑ 𝑦𝑖 log(𝑃𝑖)
𝑁−1
𝑖=0
=  − ∑ 𝑦𝑖 log(𝑃𝑖)
𝑁−1
𝑖=0
=  −log (𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒) 
 
(8) 
By using 𝑍 = (𝑧0, 𝑧1, … , 𝑧𝑁−1) to denote the output of the logits layer, we can 
provide a formal definition of the loss gradient with respect to the i-th logit:  
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑧𝑖
=  𝑃𝑖 −  𝑦𝑖  
(9) 
The complete proof of equation (9) is provided in Appendix A. Note that the 
gradient formulation presented in equation (9) is independent of the overall network 
architecture. It is the result of the gradients of the cross-entropy loss metric and 
softmax function only. 
Using equation (9), we can see how defensive distillation decreases or even 
eliminates the input gradients in the case of non-targeted perturbations. Assuming 
a given input is correctly classified by the network, the increase in distillation 
temperature 𝑇 causes the network to increase the logit component associated with 
the true class label, 𝑧𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒. As a result the probability estimate assigned by the 
network to the correct class label 𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 increases towards one.  
Recalling that 𝑌 is the one-hot representation of the ground truth label, we get that:   
lim
𝑇→∞
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑧𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒
=  lim
𝑇→∞
(𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 − 𝑦𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒) =  1 − 1 = 0 
(10) 
The loss gradient attributed to the logit value of the true class 𝑧𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 decreases  
towards zero in that case. When the training temperature is high enough, gradients 
will become too small to be represented by a standard 32-bit floating point variable. 
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Propagating the gradient backwards to the network’s input will result in a decrease 
or even an elimination of the input gradient, making the classifier network resilient 
to non-targeted perturbations. 
4.2. Targeted Input Loss Gradients 
In the case of a targeted attack, loss is calculated with respect to the target class. 
Using 𝑌𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 =  (𝑦𝑡0, 𝑦𝑡1, … , 𝑦𝑡𝑁−1) to denote the one-hot encoded vector of the 
target class, we can update equation (9) to reflect the loss gradient of a targeted 
attack: 
𝜕𝐿𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝜕𝑧𝑖
=  𝑃𝑖 − 𝑦𝑡𝑖  
(11) 
In the case of a defensively distilled network, 𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 approaches one, causing 𝑃𝑖  to 
decrease towards zero for any other class.  With that understanding, we can now 
express the limit of targeted loss gradient as distillation temperature is increased: 
lim
𝑇→∞
𝜕𝐿𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝜕𝑧𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
=  lim
𝑇→∞
(𝑃𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡) =  0 − 1 = −1 
(12) 
The loss gradient with respect to the logit as expressed in equation (12) will hence 
approach zero for the true class label, or negative one (-1) for any other class.  
Defensive distillation causes the absolute value of the input gradient with respect to 
the target class to be equal to one. This typically represents an increase of several 
orders of magnitude to the gradient, compared to the non-distilled case. This 
gradient makes defensive distillation inherently unsuitable for preventing targeted 
attacks. 
4.3. The JSMA Exception 
As noted earlier, JSMA is a targeted attack method. Given our analysis in Section 
4.2, one might expect it to defeat defensive distillation. However, as reported in 
[5][6], this is not the case. Defensive distillation is highly effective in blocking 
JSMA-based perturbations. 
Resolving this apparent contradiction requires some deeper understanding of the 
JSMA perturbation algorithm. JSMA is an iterative algorithm. In every iteration the 
algorithm attempts to perturb two input features based on the input-loss Jacobian. 
One feature is aimed to reduce the network’s certainty of the true class, while the 
other is aimed to increase its certainty for the target class. From a gradient point of 
view, JSMA is essentially built out of a “non-targeted” part and a “targeted” part. 
The gradient used for reducing the network’s certainty at the true class is what we 
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refer to in Section 4.1 as a non-targeted gradient. As we have demonstrated, this 
gradient is nullified as a result of defensive distillation. JSMA is therefore unable 
to identify a suitable pair of input features to be perturbed, and thus terminates 
prematurely, without being able to form an adversarial example. JSMA’s reliance 
on the classifier’s softmax outputs does not allow it to overcome the gradient 
masking effect created by defensive distillation. 
4.4. Analyzing Black-Box Attacks 
Under black-box settings, the adversary is assumed to have no knowledge over the 
classifier network’s parameters. The adversary is therefore unable to compute the 
network’s loss gradient directly. Instead, he is required to use some proxy to either 
the gradient itself or the network as a whole. In [14] the authors discovered 
adversarial examples are transferrable between different classifier networks. They 
show it is possible to attack a classifier model using a surrogate one. An adversary 
can train a surrogate classifier network, use white-box attack algorithms against this 
surrogate and finally use the resulting adversarial examples in order to attack the 
original classifier. The authors further show that this process is highly effective even 
when the architecture and dataset used for training the surrogate model is different 
than the original one.  
The authors of [14], further show that defensive distillation is ineffective in the 
context of black-box attacks. They train a surrogate non-distilled network, craft 
adversarial examples against this surrogate model using FGSM, and eventually feed 
the resulting adversarial examples to a distilled classifier network. As a result of 
this simple procedure, the defensively distilled network incorrectly classifies most 
of the adversarial examples presented to it. Based on those results, the authors 
assumed that defensive distillation is only effective in proximity to the data points 
used for training the model. By leveraging the results obtained in Section 4.2 we 
can provide a more accurate explanation – defensive distillation will eliminate the 
input gradient for all correctly classified inputs (whether used for training or not) 
but will not affect any incorrectly classified input. 
Defensive distillation increases the probability estimate associated with the most 
likely class in favor of the others. For an input that is correctly classified by the non-
distilled network, the most probable class is the true class (𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒). Increasing the 
distillation temperature will hence make this estimate approach one, causing the 
gradient expressed in equation (9) to decrease towards zero. However, when the 
original network fails to correctly classify an input, defensive distillation will only 
make the network more certain of the incorrect class label.  
With that in mind, the role of the surrogate model becomes clear. The perturbed 
input points crafted using the surrogate model are incorrectly classified by the 
original classifier network and are hence highly likely to be incorrectly classified 
by the distilled network as well. 
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4.4.1. Optimizing Defensive Distillation 
As described in Section 2.2.2, the defensive distillation process requires training of 
two distinct classifier networks. First a teacher model is trained, then a student 
model is trained based on the teacher’s predictions. The two-phased training 
procedure was initially aimed to allow knowledge about the interactions between 
classes to be learned by the student model. However, as the distillation temperature 
increases, the probability estimate of the true class (𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒) approaches one, pushing 
all other probabilities closer to zero. In practice, increasing the distillation 
temperature causes the softmax function to be gradually transformed into a max 
function. The amount of such knowledge about cross-class interactions rapidly 
decreases making the two-phased training procedure rather meaningless. Figure 4 
provides a graphical illustration of the effect of defensive distillation on the softmax 
output. Values for the defensively distilled network are set to either (1,0) or (0,1), 
demonstrating how softmax is transformed into a max function. 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 4. Comparing (a) normal and (b) defensively distilled softmax values. 
 
This analysis of the softmax outputs suggests it should be possible to optimize the 
defensive distillation process by using just a single network training phase. Training 
a single model with high distillation temperature in order to increase its certainty of 
the correct class label, and then setting the temperature to 1 during inference. In 
order to test the validity of this approach, we implemented an optimized version of 
the distillation process. Instead of the dual training procedure, we trained a single 
model using a high distillation temperature; set the distillation temperature to one; 
and used this model for inference. We have tested our approach with two 
defensively distilled networks trained using the MNIST and CIFAR-10 [13] 
datasets. Comparing classification accuracy as well as model resilience to 
adversarial examples, showed the optimized training procedure is on-par with the 
original defensive distillation.  
Apart from the inability to cope with targeted attacks, the dual training process is 
considered the most problematic aspect of defensive distillation. Indeed, training 
can be considered a one-time investment of effort. However, training a modern 
neural network (e.g., ResNet) can take several days and require the combined 
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computational power of many GPUs. Understanding that similar results can be 
achieved with a single training process hence represents a valuable optimization. 
 
 
5. Blocking Targeted Adversarial Examples Implies Losing the 
Ability to Learn 
The formal analysis provided in Section 4.2 leads to a much more significant insight 
about targeted white-box attacks against neural network classifiers. In order to fully 
appreciate the implications of this analysis, we should first recall a few of the 
fundamental facts regarding training a neural network classifier:  
1) The order of classes within the network output is arbitrary. Choosing a 
different mapping of classes to class indexes will not affect the network’s 
ability to train or the resulting accuracy.  
2) Network loss is a monotonically increasing, non-negative function. It is 
equal to zero when the network predicts the correct class label, and 
increases in correlation with the classification error.  
3) Classifier networks are trained using stochastic gradient descend starting 
from a random set of weights. In order to allow training to converge in a 
reasonable amount of time, a high loss gradient is required whenever 
classification error is high. Similarly low loss gradients are required when 
classification error is low, in order to be able to stop the training process. 
Equipped with those three fundamental facts, we can now re-examine the gradient 
calculations provided in sections 4.1 and 4.2.  Targeted attacks compute the loss 
with respect to some class other than the ground truth one. The loss function refers 
to this target class as if it was true, hence yielding a high loss value and a high loss 
gradient (points 2,3 above).  
From a network’s point of view, calculating the loss in the case of a targeted attack 
is similar to permuting the order of classes and attempting to retrain the network. In 
both cases the position of the “one” within the one-hot encoded labels vector is 
different than the position predicted by the network, leading to a high loss value. 
The nature of the loss function itself implies that in both cases a strong loss gradient 
is formed as well. 
This understanding has profound implications on our ability to block targeted 
adversarial attacks. Realizing that those attacks leverage the same input gradient 
that allows a network to be trained, implies that blocking them will require losing 
the network’s ability to learn. This paradox calls for a new approach to protection 
against targeted adversarial attacks. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we aimed to fill the existing gap in understanding the fundamental 
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reasons that make adversarial examples so difficult to defend against in white-box 
settings.  
We started by examining defensive distillation, one of the most promising defense 
methods suggested so far. This method aims to eliminate the network’s loss 
gradients, thereby preventing them from being used for creating adversarial 
examples. Using explicit formulation of the loss gradients resulting from the cross-
entropy loss and softmax activation function, we proved that defensive distillation 
can provide complete protection against non-targeted attacks but is not suitable for 
targeted attacks.  
While this understanding is, in itself valuable, it led to a much more significant 
insight about white-box adversarial attacks. The loss gradients used by targeted and 
non-targeted attack algorithms are in-fact different. Moreover, we showed that 
targeted adversarial attacks leverage the same gradients that are used for training 
the classifier network. This implies that in order to block targeted adversarial 
examples, the network’s ability to learn must be disabled.  
In addition to providing a solid theoretical explanation for the difficulty in 
constructing effective defense mechanism, this final conclusion points out a new 
path to pursue with regard to the study of defense mechanisms. It indicates that 
researchers should look for ways to train a network and then obstruct or impede its 
ability to learn without harming its classification accuracy.  
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Appendix A – Derivation of the Cross Entropy Loss and  
Softmax Activation Function 
 
This section describes the gradient derivation of the cross-entropy loss combined 
with the softmax activation function. This derivation was first formally described 
in [10]. Our version is based on [20] which provides an easier read. 
 
Derivation of the Softmax Activation Function 
Let 𝑧𝑖 denote the i-th component of the logits layer output given some network input 
𝑥. 
The probability estimate of the i-th class associated by the softmax function to that 
input can be expressed as: 
𝑃𝑖 =  
𝑒𝑧𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑧𝑘𝑁−1𝑘=0
 
 
The derivative of 𝑃𝑖  with respect to 𝑧𝑘 can then be computed as follows: 
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝑧𝑗
=  
𝜕 (
𝑒𝑧𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑧𝑘𝑁−1𝑘=0
)
𝜕𝑧𝑗
  
When 𝑖 = 𝑗 we get: 
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝑧𝑗
=  
𝜕 (
𝑒𝑧𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑧𝑘𝑁−1𝑘=0
)
𝜕𝑧𝑗
=  
𝑒 𝑧𝑖 ∑ 𝑒𝑧𝑘𝑁−1𝑘=0 −  𝑒
𝑧𝑖𝑒𝑧𝑗
(∑ 𝑒𝑧𝑘𝑁−1𝑘=0 )
2
 
 
=  
𝑒𝑧𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑧𝑘𝑁−1𝑘=0
 ∙  
(∑ 𝑒𝑧𝑘𝑁−1𝑘=0 ) − 𝑒
𝑧𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝑧𝑘𝑁−1𝑘=0
=  𝑃𝑖(1 − 𝑃𝑗) 
 
Similarly for the case of 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 we get: 
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝑧𝑗
=  
𝜕 (
𝑒𝑧𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑧𝑘𝑁−1𝑘=0
)
𝜕𝑧𝑗
=
0 −  𝑒𝑧𝑖𝑒𝑧𝑗
(∑ 𝑒𝑧𝑘𝑁−1𝑘=0 )
2
  
 
=
− 𝑒𝑧𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑧𝑘𝑁−1𝑘=0
 ∙  
𝑒𝑧𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝑧𝑘𝑁−1𝑘=0
=  −𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑗 
 
Combining the two last results we get: 
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𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝑧𝑗
=  {
𝑃𝑖(1 − 𝑃𝑗), 𝑖 = 𝑗
−𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
 
 
Derivation of the Cross-Entropy Loss 
The cross-entropy loss associated with the given input 𝑥 is defined as: 
𝐿 =  − ∑ 𝑦𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖)
𝑁−1
𝑖=0
 
where 𝑌 = (𝑦0, 𝑦1 , … , 𝑦𝑁−1) is the one-hot encoded ground truth vector (𝑦𝑖 ∈
{0,1}). 
 
Treating ‘log’ as ‘ln’ for the sake of derivation, we can therefore express the 
gradient of the cross-entropy loss with respect to the i-th logit component as: 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑧𝑖
=  
𝜕(− ∑ 𝑦𝑘 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑘)
𝑁−1
𝑘=0 )
𝜕𝑧𝑖
 
 
= − ∑ 𝑦𝑘 ∙
𝜕 log(𝑃𝑘)
𝜕𝑧𝑖
= 
𝑁−1
𝑘=0
− ∑ 𝑦𝑘 ∙
𝜕 log(𝑃𝑘)
𝜕𝑃𝑘
∙
𝜕𝑃𝑘
𝜕𝑧𝑖
𝑁−1
𝑘=0
 
 
=  − ∑ 𝑦𝑘  ∙  
1
𝑃𝑘
 ∙  
𝜕𝑃𝑘
𝜕𝑧𝑖
𝑁−1
𝑘=0
 
Combining the Softmax Function  Cross-Entropy Derivatives 
Given that the softmax derivative equation for the case when 𝑖 = 𝑗 is different from 
all other cases, we reorder the loss derivative equation a little separating this case 
from the others: 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑧𝑖
=  − ∑ 𝑦𝑘  ∙  
1
𝑃𝑘
 ∙  
𝜕𝑃𝑘
𝜕𝑧𝑖
𝑁−1
𝑘=0
 
 
= −𝑦𝑖  ∙  
1
𝑃𝑖
 ∙  
𝜕𝑃𝑖
𝜕𝑧𝑖
− ∑ 𝑦𝑘  ∙  
1
𝑃𝑘
 ∙  
𝜕𝑃𝑘
𝜕𝑧𝑖
𝑘≠𝑖
 
Now, we can use the softmax derivative we have calculated earlier and get: 
 
= −𝑦𝑖 ∙
𝑃𝑖(1 − 𝑃𝑖)
𝑃𝑖
− ∑
𝑦𝑘 ∙ (−𝑃𝑘𝑃𝑖)
𝑃𝑘
𝑘≠𝑖
=  −𝑦𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖𝑃𝑖 + ∑ 𝑦𝑘𝑃𝑖
𝑘≠𝑖
 
 
= 𝑃𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 + ∑ 𝑦𝑘
𝑘≠𝑖
) −  𝑦𝑖 
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However, since 𝑌 is the one-hot encoded ground truth vector, we get that: 
 𝑦𝑖 + ∑ 𝑦𝑘
𝑘≠𝑖
= ∑ 𝑦𝑘
𝑁−1
𝑘=0
= 1 
 
and hence: 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑧𝑖
=  𝑃𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 + ∑ 𝑌𝑘
𝑘≠𝑖
) −  𝑦𝑖 =  𝑃𝑖 −  𝑦𝑖   
 
 
